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CASE NOTES

the murderer is thereby precluded from profiting from his crime and yet
has not been denied his constitutional rights as regard forfeiture of his
estate.
PROPERTY-EQUITABLE RELIEF ALLOWED FOR
IMPROVEMENTS MADE UNDER THE MISTAKEN BELIEF OF OWNERSHIP
Plaintiff secured a building permit to construct a dwelling on lot 15
and immediately commenced construction on lot 16, which was adjacent,
under the mistaken belief that he was on lot 15. Upon discovering his
mistake a month later, he undertook to purchase lot 16 from the owner
and continued construction on the dwelling. After a few weeks time had
elapsed, and the building was near completion, plaintiff received from the
defendant lot-owner a demand to suspend construction, with which he
complied. Plaintiff then filed suit in equity, alleging the mistake and praying that defendant be required to purchase the improvements placed on
lot 16 or to convey said lot to the plaintiff at its reasonable value. The
chancellor's degree sustained plaintiff's prayer, ordering the parties to exchange deeds; and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the decree of the trial court. Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d 563 (Fla.,
1956).
At common law, even in equity, improvements of a permanent nature
placed on or attached to land without the consent of the owner became
part of the realty and title thereto vested in the owner.' The rationale
underlying the common-law rule, as stated in the Restatement of the Law
of Restitution, is that one who intermeddles with the property of another
assumes the risk as to his right to do so. 2
The common-law rule is not wholly consistent with the principles of
restitution for mistake; but its harshness to the improver, acting under
the mistaken belief of ownership, has been greatly relieved, either in
equity or by statute.8
The leading case among those following the common-law doctrine, and
thus, denying the right to recover for improvements made on another's
land in the mistaken belief of ownership, is the frequently cited decision
of Putnam v. Ritchie, which held that the court was not authorized to
introduce a new principle into the law (that of allowing recovery based
on mistake) without the sanction of the legislature; and on this basis, the
4
court declined to grant relief to the improver.
1 McCreary v. Lake Boulevard Sponge Exchange Co., 133 Fla. 740, 183 So. 7 (1938).
2

Restatement of the Law of Restitution, § 42 (Comment "a").

3 Ibid.

4 6 Paige (N.Y.) 390 (1837).
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The first actual rift with the common law occurred in 1841, when, in
Bright v. Boyd, Justice Story said: "to me it seems manifestly unjust and
inequitable, thus to appropriate to one man the property and money of
another, who is in no default. The argument, I am aware, is that the
moment the house is built, it belongs to the owner of the land by mere
operation of law; and that he may certainly possess and enjoy his own.
But this is merely stating the technical rule of law, by which the true
owner seeks to hold, what, in a just sense, he never had title to, that is, the
house: It is not answering the objection; but merely and dryly stating,
that the law so holds. But, then, admitting this to be so, does it not furnish
a strong ground why equity should interpose, and grant relief?" 5
The diversity of authority may be pointed up by referring to a case
which was decided in the same year as Bright v. Boyd. This was the case
of Seymour v. Watson, where it was said: "that the defendant has placed
the fence in question on the land of another by mistake, does not alter the
matter; it was no less a part of the freehold for that reason."6'
In a 1924 case in which the plaintiff, under the mistaken impression that
he was building on his own property, erected a house on defendant's land,
without defendant's knowledge, the court reaffirmed Putnam v. Ritchie.
It was declared that if one mistakenly erects a building on the land of
another, who knows nothing about it, and cannot, therefore, acquiesce, he
7
has no relief on the ground of mistake only.
8
In Hardy v. Burroughs, decided in 1930, the court, after acknowledging that the weight of authority was to the contrary, followed Bright v.
Boyd, in granting affirmative relief to the innocent improver. The court
here termed the Bright v. Boyd case "better-reasoned."
I As the law has developed, the split of authority has been a continuing
one. The basic reason for this is that while one faction feels that the common law should be tenaciously adhered to, the opposition reasons thusly:
in most cases, a decree giving the owner the election of paying for the
enhanced value of his land or of releasing the land to the improver on
payment of its market value, would result in less hardship to the owner
than would result to the innocent improver if affirmative relief were
denied.
In a recent case (1950), it was declared that the only way one erecting
a building on another's land in the mistaken belief that he owns the land
can compel a conveyance thereof to himself, is to prove that the true
5 1 Story 478, 4 Fed. Cas. 127, 133 (1841).
65 Ind. 555, 556 (1841).
7Friel v. Turk, 95 N.J.E. 425, 123 A. 610 (1924).

8251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930).
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owner had knowledge of the progress of the work.9 This holding, in
effect, adheres to the common law, because the result is: no relief for
plaintiff unless he can prove laches on the part of the defendant.
To illustrate the divergence among the authorities, even at the present
time, a 1952 case stated: "where one builds a house on another's land by
mistake, a court of equity does not follow the common-law rule denying
all relief, but follows the more lenient rule of the civil law, and permits
the owner of the land to elect whether to pay the value added to the land
by the building, or take the value of the land."' 10
Illinois' position on improvements made on the land of another by mistake has been closely akin to the national outlook. In 1874, the Illinois
Supreme Court, in Mathes v. Dobscbuetz,"1 said that improvements made
upon real estate by one who has no title or interest in it, without the consent of the fee owner, become part and parcel of the land, with the title
thereto vesting in the owner of the fee. The holding of this court was
affirmed in a 1924 case.' 2 In 1929, the case of Olin v. Reinecke was decided.' 3 In that case, the plaintiff built a two-flat building and a two-car
garage on lot 34, which he did not own, under the belief that it was lot 33,
which he did own. It was decreed that defendant should pay the reasonable value of the improvements, or the property should be sold and the
proceeds distributed as decree by the chancellor.
Apparently, Illinois earlier followed the decisions denying relief to the
innocent improver, but now seems to conform to the line of cases emanating from Justice Story's opinion in Bright v. Boyd, because Olin v.
4
Reinecke was affirmed in a 1955 case.'
-- It should be noted that in the instant case, the plaintiff-improver is
bringing an action against the defendant landowner for affirmative relief
for the improvements made by plaintiff. This is mentioned because it is a
well-settled rule in equity that if the landowner brings ejectment against
the improver, the latter is allowed to counterclaim for the value of his
improvements, by operation of the equitable maxim: "[H]e who seeks
equity must do equity."' 5 In other words, had the plaintiff in the instant
case been sued in ejectment by the defendant, the plaintiff would unquestionably have been able to recover on the basis of his counterclaim.
Additionally, many jurisdictions have statutes providing relief against
an action of ejectment to a person who has made improvements on
9Riggle v. Skill, 9 N.J. Super. 372, 74 A. 2d. 424 (1950).
1oMcCreary v. Shields, 333 Mich. 290, 295, 52 N.W.2d. 853, 856 (1952).
1172 11. 438 (1874).
12 Nilson Bros. v. Kahn, 314 Ill. 275, 145 N.E. 340 (1924).
1'336 111. 530, 168 N.E. 676 (1929).
14 Pope v. Speiser, 7 Il.
2d. 231, 130 N.E. 2d. 507 (1955).
15 Jensen v. Probert, 174 Ore. 143, 151, 148 P. 2d. 248, 254 (1944).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

another's land in good faith and under color of title. 16 Many jurisdictions
have allowed affirmative recovery under one of these Occupying Claimant
or Betterment Statutes. 1 7 The suggestion has been made that the enactment of these statutes may have retarded the development of a broader
rule of equitable restitution. "It seems likely that Story's view, which
would permit restitution, would have prevailed but for the prevalence of
the so-called betterment statutes. As it is, however, the non-statutory law
in most jurisdictions has remained as it was originally since most of the
situations calling for restitution are within the betterment statutes."' 8 Illinois does not have an Occupying Claimant or Betterment Statute.
In a bare majority of the jurisdictions of this country wherein the question has clearly received consideration, support has been given to the rule
that, not even in equity can one who has made improvements on the land
of another, believing himself to be the owner, recover therefor, as plaintiff, where the owner has been guilty of no fraud, or acquiescence with
knowledge, or other inequitable conduct. Therefore, the instant case must
be categorized as a strong minority decision.
The actual decree in the instant case distinguishes it, however, even
from other minority decisions. In other words, the other cases granting
relief to the improver have given the defendant-landowner the prerogative
of paying the reasonable value of the improvements, or selling the land at
is market value to the plaintiff-improver, 19 while in the Voss case, the
court decreed that the parties should exchange deeds, upon payment by
the plaintiff of a certain sum and court costs. It is interesting to note that
when an Illinois Appellate Court proposed an identical decree in 1929, it
was overruled by the Supreme Court. 20 The apparent reason for the
court's hesitancy to compel an exchange of properties may be found in
the old legal bromide that each piece of real estate is unique. This court
seemingly rebutted that presumption when it stated that lots 15 and 16
were of substantially the same value and "there is no contention that either
of the lots had any peculiar or intrinsic value."
The importance of Voss v. Forgue lies in its re-emphasis of a strong,
and apparently better-reasoned minority in a phase of-the law where a
well-defined divergence of authority has existed for more than a century.
In addition, the court in this case has provided for the application of a
decree that goes to the root of an intricate problem, and solves it equitably-logically-practicably-and progressively.
16 E.g., Minnesota Statutes, 1941, 5 559.08.

17Anderson v. Sutton, 308 Mo. 406, 275 S.W. 32 (1925); Kian v. Kefalogiannis, 158
Va. 129, 163 S.E. 535 (1932).
18 Seavy & Scott's Notes on the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, at page 29.
19 McCreary v. Shields, 333 Mich. 290, 52 N.XV. 2d. 853 (1952); Hardy v. Burroughs,
251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930).
20 Olin v. Reinecke, 336 111.530, 168 N.E. 676 (1929).

